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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the impact on aggregate economic activity in a small, open region of an 
income-tax funded expansion in public consumption that has no direct supply-side effects.  
The conventional balanced budget multiplier produces an unambiguously positive 
macroeconomic stimulus, but the incorporation of negative competitiveness elements, through 
the operation of the local labor market, renders this positive outcome less certain. Simulation 
using a single-region Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Scotland 
demonstrates that the creation of local amenity effects, and the extent to which these are 
incorporated into local wage bargaining, is central to the analysis.  
JEL Numbers: C68, D58, H71, R13, R23 
 
Key words: Fiscal federalism, devolution, regional labour market, Scotland, CGE analysis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Individual states or regions within a federal system typically face a very restricted range of 
macroeconomic policy options. The region has no monetary policy levers and often has only a 
limited number of fiscal options. This paper revisits the theory of a balanced budget fiscal 
expansion within a small open regional economy context. In particular, it investigates the 
ability of the regional government to stimulate the local economy through an expansion in 
expenditure on a public consumption good financed through an increase in the rate of local 
income tax. The formal analysis is extended through simulation results from an inter-temporal 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Scotland: this policy option is at present 
available to the Scottish Government.   
 
 For pedagogic reasons, public consumption is assumed to have no direct supply-side effects. 
In this type of situation, the conventional Keynesian, fixed-price, balanced-budget multiplier 
produces an unambiguously positive macroeconomic stimulus (Haavelmo, 1945). But the 
incorporation of negative competitiveness elements, through the operation of the local labor 
market, renders the analysis more complex and the positive outcome much less certain 
(Knoester and van der Windt, 1987). This is particularly the case in a regional context, where 
there is typically a high degree of openness both in factor and product markets (Liebeg et al., 
2007). Two key parameters are important in determining not only the size but also the sign of 
the macroeconomic effect. These are the extent to which households value public 
expenditures, weighed against the increase in taxes, and the degree to which this valuation is 
incorporated into the local wage bargain.   
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2. THE BASIC THEORETICAL MODEL  
 
We adopt a long-run, small, open-economy (SOE) model of the region in the spirit of the 
disaggregated approach presented in Layard et al. (1991, Ch. 6) which incorporates imperfect 
competition in the regional labor market. Given the SOE assumption, the price of imports and 
the cost of capital are both set exogenously, in perfectly integrated national/international 
markets with regional exports determined through conventional trade functions (Armington, 
1969; Engel and Rogers, 1996). That is to say, output produced under conditions of perfect 
competition within the region, is not a perfect substitute for the output of other regions.1 This 
permits adjustments in the price of the regional good relative to the price of extra-regional 
goods and allows variation in the regional real and nominal wage in the long run. 
 
Production occurs under well-behaved, linear homogeneous production functions, with two 
factors, capital and labor, and there is a single representative household. In the present context, 
long-run equilibrium implies that both the regional capital stock and population are optimally 
adjusted. Given that we assume no natural change in population, this implies that long-run 
equilibrium states are characterised by zero net investment and zero net migration. 
  
An important assumption is that the balanced budget increase in public consumption, financed 
by the increase in the rate of income tax, has no direct supply-side effects: it has no direct 
impact on the productivity of capital and labor or the efficiency of production.2 Much 
expenditure on arts and culture, the police, town planning, the environment, and care for 
senior citizens would likely fall in this category. However, the primary reason for adopting 
this assumption is heuristic. It simplifies the analysis in a way that captures the traditional 
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macroeconomic view of public expenditure. In this analysis there is a positive demand-side 
impact on regional output through a variant of the standard balanced budget multiplier 
(Haavelmo, 1945). However, this is likely to be accompanied by negative supply-side effects 
operating via the impact of higher income tax rates on the nominal wage, generated by 
regional bargaining. We begin with a more detailed specification of our analytical model. 
 
Net migration is identified as a positive function of the relative real wage and employment 
rates across regions (Layard et al., 1991) which is an extension of the Harris and Todaro 
(1970) model.3 Equation (1) states the zero net migration equilibrium condition. It identifies 
the set of changes in the post-tax real consumption wage, dw, the employment rate, de, and the 
proportionate rate of income tax, ,dW for which the net migration is zero: 4  
(1) 0, 0.e edw z de d zE W E  d t     
Equation (1) indicates that there is a negative relationship between the change in the post-tax 
real wage and the change in the employment rate across zero net migration (long-run) 
equilibria. The coefficient ez  is derived directly from setting the standard flow-migration 
equation to zero and rearranging terms. The sign of ze is negative because if the attractiveness 
of a region to migrants is to remain constant, when the employment rate falls, the real wage 
must rise and vice-versa. 
 
However, equation (1) is rather unconventional in that it also includes the term dE W
 
in an 
attempt to capture the effect on the migration decision of the locally financed public amenity 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Ketterer, 2012).5 ȕ is the parameter indicating the degree to which 
households value public, as against private, consumption. It represents the subjective net 
valuation by households of the beneficial use of the increased public expenditures weighed 
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against the accompanying increase in their income tax payment. Where households attach no 
value to the amenity created by the increased expenditures, ȕ = 0 and the standard formulation 
of the net migration condition applies, with the post-tax real consumption wage governing 
migration decisions. However, if public expenditure generates a positive amenity, so that 
households attach any value at all to the services produced by the additional expenditure, then 
ȕ > 0. For a given employment rate, the larger the value of ȕ, the lower the post-tax real 
consumption wage required to preclude net outmigration.  When ȕ = 1, the potential migrant is 
indifferent between marginal changes in local public expenditure and private consumption so 
that in this case the pre-tax real consumption wage drives migration.6 Where ȕ > 1, there is a 
positive marginal preference for local public expenditure over private consumption. 
 
The change in pre-tax nominal wage, dW, is defined in equation (2) 
(2) dW dcpi dw dW       
where dcpi is the change in regional consumer price index, given as 
(3) 1 0.W Wdcpi cpi dW cpi ! t  
Equation (3) expresses the change in the regional consumer price index as a function solely of 
the change in the regional nominal wage. This parsimonious specification is permitted by the 
exogeneity of import prices and the cost of capital, together with the linear homogeneous 
nature of production.   
 
The change in labor demand is a function of the change in the nominal pre-tax wage and the 
tax rate, so that  
(4) 0, 0.W Wdn n dW n d n nW WW  d t     
It is important to note that equation (4) represents a general equilibrium relationship, 
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constructed on the basis of full income endogeneity. Labor demand is negatively related to the 
nominal pre-tax wage through competitiveness and factor substitution effects. This means that 
any consumption effects from a higher nominal wage are more than offset by adverse 
substitution effects in production and reduced exports and import substitution.7 On the other 
hand, labor demand is a positive function of the tax rate, reflecting the operation of the 
conventional Keynesian balanced budget multiplier. This implies that a transfer of income 
from the private to the public sector generates a net demand stimulus, primarily because of the 
lower saving and import propensity of the public sector, together with the greater labor 
intensity of public sector activity.  
   
Finally, through the bargaining function, the change in the real post-tax consumption wage is 
positively related to the change in the regional employment rate (Layard et al., 1991) 
(5) 0.e edw b de d bDE W  t     
The motivation for the positive sign on the employment rate term is that union power increases 
as the employment rate rises, resulting in a higher bargained real wage. However, in this 
formulation of the regional bargaining function, the local amenity generated by the 
expenditure is allowed to influence wage bargaining behavior directly.  The parameter Į, 
which takes a value between 0 and 1, reflects the extent to which the value of the amenity is 
taken into account in the wage bargaining process. 
 
The possible amenity effects on the local bargained real wage appear to be neglected in the 
literature on fiscal federalism. Since the amenity provision is exogenous to the individual 
ZRUNHU LQ D SHUIHFWO\ FRPSHWLWLYH ODERU PDUNHW WKH DPHQLW\ LV LJQRUHG LQ WKH ZRUNHU¶V
work/leisure choice, so that only the post-tax real consumption wage matters.8 This 
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corresponds to one situation in which the value of Į is zero. This value will also apply in our 
model if bargaining is atomized so that it fails to take into account any public expenditure 
implications. However, in the bargaining context the public good externality will be 
internalised in so far as local unions cover a significant section of the labor force and act co-
operatively. Under many local/regional income tax arrangements, including the Scottish 
Variable Rate, the scale of the amenity is tied directly to tax income and therefore to the 
bargained wage. For these cases the value of Į will rise above zero. In the mid 1970s, the 
Social Contract between the unions and the UK Labour Government explicitly limited wage 
bargaining in response to government commitments to increase the social wage. Similarly, the 
present Scottish First Minister, Alex Salmond, has emphasised the potential importance of the 
social wage, which includes elements of public as well as private consumption. 
 
3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF A BALANCED BUDGET FISCAL EXPANSION  
 
Changes in the Employment Rate, de, and the Nominal Pre-Tax Wage, W 
 
Using equations (1)-(5), the change in the five endogenous variables dn, de, dcpi, dw and dW, 
can be determined, given the change in the value of the exogenous tax rate, GĲ. A key variable 
in the analysis is the change in regional competitiveness that accompanies the fiscal 
expansion, which, in the present model, is identified by the change in the nominal pre-tax 
wage, dW. This, together with the change in the employment rate, is determined by the 
interaction of the migration and bargaining functions. Combining equations (1), (2) and (3) 
produces the zero net migration (ZNM) function, expressed in terms of the pre-tax nominal 
wage 
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(6) 1
.
1 1
e
W W
zdW de d
cpi cpi
E W    
If GĲ is set to zero, equation (6) gives the initial zero net migration function in the change in 
nominal pre-tax wage-employment rate space. This is represented by the curve Z0 in Figure 1, 
which has a slope equal to ze/(1-cpiW) < 0 and passes through the origin. 
 
Similarly, combining equations (2), (3) and (5) gives the bargaining function in pre-tax 
nominal wage form 
(7) 1
.
1 1
e
W W
bdW de d
cpi cpi
DE W    
Again, setting GĲ to zero in equation (7) produces the initial bargained real wage function 
(BRW) with a slope equal to be/(1-cpiW) > 0 which also passes through the origin. This is 
curve B0 in Figure 1.9 
 
Equations (6) and (7) are sufficient to tie down the change in the employment rate and 
nominal wage, de and dWWKDWDFFRPSDQ\WKHILVFDOH[SDQVLRQGĲproducing 
(1 ) 0
e e
de d
b z
E D W  d   
and 
(8) (1 ) (1 )
.(1 )( )
e e
W e e
b zdW d
cpi b z
E DE W      
It is useful to analyze these results diagrammatically using Figure 1. Where a local income tax 
increase of GĲ is levied, the ZNM function (equation 6) moves vertically by an amount equal to 
((1-ȕ)/(1-cpiW))dĲ. The tax increase also shifts the BRW function (equation 7) vertically but by 
((1-Įȕ)/(1-cpiW))dĲ. Note that the parameter restrictions imply that 1-Įȕ-ȕ so that the BRW 
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function cannot experience a smaller upward movement than the ZNM function. We begin by 
considering the impact of the fiscal expansion under alternative assumptions about the labour 
market. These are encapsulated in the YDOXHRIĮZKLFKPXVWOLHEHWZHHQ]HURDQGXQLW\ 
  
A Unified Regional Bargain over the Social WDJHĮ . Where Į = 1, the amenity 
value of the public expenditure is fully reflected in the bargaining equation. This would apply 
where the whole workforce is covered by a single bargain. In essence, this would be where 
workers bargain over a social wage. In this case the ZNM and the BRW functions both move 
vertically by the same amount. There is no change in the employment rate, de = 0, so that the 
equilibrium lies on the dW axis, that is on the line AJ0C in Figure 1. The equilibrium point 
along this line depends solely on the value of ȕ 
 
 Where ȕ  the additional public expenditure produces no amenity value to local residents, 
the ZNM and the BRW functions both shift upwards by dĲ/(1-cpiW) to B1 and Z1 respectively 
and the equilibrium is at A. The change in the pre-tax nominal wage is dĲ/(1-cpiW) so that the 
full tax increase is incorporated into higher nominal wages, including the term (1-cpiW)-1 to 
accommodate the increase in regional cpi. 
 
Where ȕ = 1, so that the value of the increased public expenditure to local residents just equals 
the forgone private consumption, neither the ZNM nor the BRW curve moves. There is simply 
a switching of part of the pre-tax wage from private to public expenditure: there is no change 
in the employment rate and no loss of competitiveness through higher nominal wages. The 
new equilibrium remains at the origin. 
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Where ȕ > 1, so that the residents have a positive preference for public as against private 
consumption, the ZNM and BRW functions move downwards so that the nominal pre-tax 
wage falls to an equilibrium at a point such as C. With unified region bargaining, a balanced 
budget fiscal expansion has no impact on the employment rate but affects the nominal wage, 
and therefore competitiveness, in a manner inversely related to the value of public expenditure 
to the residents.   
 
Bargaining solely over the Private Real Wage: Į   . Where the social wage is 
irrelevant, such as under atomised bargaining or under a perfectly competitive labour market, 
Į= 0. From equation (7) this means that in Figure 1, for any value of ȕ the BRW curve moves 
upwards by the amount dĲ/(1-cpiW) to B1. The subsequent competitive labour market 
equilibrium will lie on this line, ADMLE. Where the public amenity has no value, so that ȕ = 
0, the new equilibrium is at A, with the change in the nominal pre-tax wage as dĲ/(1-cpiW). 
Where ȕ = 1, the ZNM curve remains static at Z0 and the new equilibrium is at D. Using 
equation (8) gives the result that at D, the change in the nominal pre-tax wage is positive and 
is given as  
0.(1 )( )
e
W e e
z ddW
cpi b z
W  !    
Values of ȕ between zero and one generate equilibria along the line segment AD and values of 
ȕ greater than 1 lead to equilibria further down the BRW function B1, to points such as M, L 
and E. In all cases the employment rate, de, falls. 
 
The General CDVHĮ . :KHUHĮOLHVEHWZHHQ]HURDQGXQLW\IRUDparticular 
value of ȕ the associated values of dW and de lie on the appropriate ZNM line. For example, 
with ȕ = 1, the appropriate ZNM function is Z0. In this case the equilibrium will lie on the line 
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+'ZKHUHWKHFORVHUWKHYDOXHRIĮLVWR]HURWKHFOoser is the equilibrium to D. For lower 
values of ȕ (1 >ȕ  0), the ZNM function is above and parallel to 0HD. The relevant range of 
equilibrium values will again lie between the vertical zero employment rate change line, 
AJ0C, and the BRW function, B1, shown as ADMLE. Again, the less workers bargain for a 
social wage, the closer the equilibrium will be to the ADMLE curve.  
 
,W LVFOHDU WKDW WKHHTXLOLEULXPPXVW OLH LQ WKHVKDGHGDUHDLQ)LJXUH:KHUHȕ  WKH
equilibrium is within the darker shaded triangle, AD0. With these parameter restrictions, there 
is only one point where inter-regional competitiveness is not negatively affected by the fiscal 
expansion. This is where Į = ȕ = 1, the equilibrium at the origin. In every other outcome in the 
triangle AD0, regional competitiveness is reduced. Where ȕ > 1, the possible equilibria are 
represented by the lighter shading. In these cases there are combinations of the BRW and 
ZNM functions where the nominal wage falls, so that regional competitiveness could increase 
with a local fiscal expansion. 
 
Changes in Total Employment, dn 
 
The results in Figure 1 give changes in the nominal wage and the employment rate, but our 
central concern is the change in economic activity and specifically in aggregate employment. 
In general the level of employment and the employment rate diverge because the population 
(and therefore the work force) is endogenous. Figure 1 shows that under a wide range of 
parameter values, a balanced fiscal expansion generates an increase in the nominal wage and 
therefore reduces regional competitiveness. However, where this is the case, the change in 
employment is the result of the trade-off between the positive demand-side stimulus, generated 
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by the Keynesian balanced budget multiplier, and the negative competitiveness effects, 
produced by the higher nominal wage. 
 
This analysis follows that of Knoester and van der Windt (1987) who argue that, at a national 
level, forward tax shifting by workers produces a reduction in competitiveness and therefore a 
possible inverted Haavelmo effect; that is, a negative balanced budget multiplier.  Substituting 
equation (8) into equation (4) gives the employment change as 
  
(9) (1 )( ) ( (1 ) (1 ))
(1 )( )
W e e W e e
W e e
n cpi b z n b zdn d
cpi b z
W E DE Wª º      « » ¬ ¼  
where 
2( ) ( ) ( )
, , 0dn dn dnD E D E
w w w tw w w w .  
Clearly the change in employment is positively related to the value of the amenity generated 
by the government expenditure, ȕ, and the extent to which this is reflected in the regional 
bargained wage, Į. However, our central concern is the sign of the employment change that 
accompanies the balanced fiscal expansion. Again we approach this both diagrammatically 
and algebraically. 
 
First, setting dn equal to zero in equation (4) and rearranging gives the value of dW for which 
the fiscal expansion has a zero employment impact 
0.
W
ndW d
n
W W  t  
 
This line is plotted in Figure 1 as GMHJK, where the intercept J on the dW axis is 
( / )Wn n dW W . All combinations of the change in pre-tax nominal wage and employment rate 
below GHJK produce an increase in employment. All points in Figure 1 above this line result 
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in a reduction in employment. 
 
Equilibria involving no increase in the pre-tax nominal wage are unambiguously associated 
with an expansion in employment.  This includes the origin, which is the equilibrium where Į 
= ȕ = 1. Here no price changes accompany the fiscal expansion so that the regional economy 
operates as under the standard Keynesian balanced budget multiplier with dn = nĲGĲ. But there 
is also a range of equilibria where the change in pre-tax nominal wage is positive, so that 
regional competitiveness falls but employment still rises. The corollary is that as long as there 
is a positive demand side stimulus from the balanced fiscal expansion, so that nĲ > 0, there is 
always some set of values for Į and ȕ LQWKHUDQJHĮȕ ZKHUHHPSOR\PHQWFKDQJHZLOO
be positive. In Figure 1 the equilibria falling in the triangle 0HJ are in this category.  
 
An alternative approach is to set dn equal to zero in equation (9), and rearrange to generate the 
combinations of the parameters Į and ȕ that produce zero employment change. For a positive 
employment change the ȕ parameter must be greater than a minimum value, E , given by 
(10) (1 )
 1e e W
e e W
b z n cpi
b z n
WE D
ª º ª º  « » « »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
 
where 0
nW
Ew w  and 0Wn
Ew !w , recalling that Wn takes a negative sign. 
  
Without imposing additional parameter restrictions, equations (9) and (10) are difficult to 
interpret intuitively. Figure 1 helps conceptually because a number of the parameters enter 
only one of the three functions identified there, so that the effect of varying individual 
parameters is clarified. However, the sign of the employment change is determined by the 
relative size of the different effects, which proves difficult to capture analytically. This implies 
  15 
that key general equilibrium elasticities, specifically ,W Wcpi n  and nW , determine not just the 
quantitative but also the qualitative nature of the balanced fiscal expansion. These elasticities 
depend upon the full operation of the economic system. We therefore pursue the analysis 
through numerical simulation using a regional Computable General Equilibrium model, 
employing extensive sensitivity analysis.10  
  
4. COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELLING: AN APPLICATION 
TO SCOTTISH DEVOLUTION 
 
Regional Computable General Equilibrium Modelling 
 
The use of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) simulation to identify the likely impacts 
of fiscal innovations is well established both at the national (Shoven and Whalley, 1992) and 
regional levels (Hirte, 1998; Partridge and Rickman, 2010). We adopt such an approach here 
in order to operationalize the analytical model outlined in Sections 2 and 3. However, the CGE 
simulations also generate additional information. The analytical model focuses on the 
aggregate labour market. The CGE simulations widen the scope of the study to incorporate the 
changes in the values of a range of additional aggregate variables, such as GDP, household 
consumption and investment, and allow for sectoral disaggregation. Similarly, the analytical 
model gives only long-run equilibrium values while the CGE dynamic simulations identify the 
evolution of the economy to the new long-run equilibrium.  
 
One problem in tackling this issue through simulation is specifying the appropriate values for 
the parameters Į and ȕ The UK has no experience of a local income tax and there is no 
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consensus, even at the national level, on the nature of long-run tax effects on the bargained 
real wage (Church et al., 1993). Further, whilst there is evidence from other countries on 
values of Į and ȕ, the results are extremely mixed and depend on the composition of public 
expenditures (Bartik, 1992; Cebula, 2002; Dahlberg and Fredriksson, 2001; Dalenberg and 
Partridge, 1995; Day, 1992; Feld and Kirchgassner, 2002; Fisher, 1997; Gabe and Bell, 2004; 
Helms, 1985; Mofidi and Stone, 1990; Wallace, 1993). The available empirical evidence 
therefore does not allow us to tie down the values of Į and ȕ precisely. However, our reading 
of the literature is that the tendency of conventional macroeconomic analysis to ignore the 
potential direct benefits of regional public expenditures is rejected by those studies that 
provide a balanced treatment of tax and expenditure effects (e.g. Gabe and Bell, 2004). 
Furthermore, the suggestion that the composition of expenditures influences key parameter 
values implies that these are sensitive to policy choices. Against this background, there is a 
strong case for progressing the analysis via numerical simulation as long as the sensitivity of 
the results to the values taken for Į and ȕ is a central feature. 
  
AMOS: A Macro-Micro Model of Scotland 
 
AMOS is a CGE modelling framework calibrated to a base year Social Accounting Matrix for 
Scotland built around the 2004 Scottish Input-Output Table (Office of the Chief Economic 
Adviser, Scottish Government, 2007).  AMOS is an acronym for A Micro-Macro Model Of the 
Scottish Economy, so named because it combines micro and macro-economic elements.11 
Essentially, it is a fully specified, empirical implementation of the skeletal theoretical model 
developed in Sections 2 and 3.  It has three domestic transactor groups. These are the personal 
sector, corporations and government; and four major components of final demand: 
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consumption, investment, government expenditure and exports. There are eleven 
commodities/activities but in the simulation results reported in Table 2, these are aggregated 
into three broad industrial groups: manufacturing, non-manufacturing traded and a sheltered 
sector.12 
   
In this version of the model, consumption and investment decisions reflect inter-temporal 
optimization with perfect foresight. The core equations for this element of the model are 
available in Lecca et al. (2010; 2013). Real government expenditure is equal to the base year 
level plus an additional amount that just exhausts the incremental revenues raised by the local 
income tax. This implies that government expenditure becomes dependent on the entire 
general equilibrium of the system, which is exactly what would happen if the Scottish Variable 
Rate were to be implemented. The demand for Scottish, Rest of the UK (RUK) and Rest of the 
World (ROW) exports is determined via conventional export demand functions where the 
default price elasticity is set at 2.0. Imports are obtained through an Armington link 
(Armington, 1969) and therefore relative-price sensitive with trade substitution elasticities of 
2.0 (Gibson, 1990). 
 
In all the simulations in this paper there is one representative household and a single Scottish 
labour market characterised by perfect sectoral mobility. All industrial sectors are taken to be 
perfectly competitive and produce using multi-level CES production functions. The elasticity 
of substitution in the production of gross output and value added is 0.3 and is Leontief for 
intermediate demands (Harris, 1989). We do not explicitly model financial flows, our 
assumption being that Scotland is a price-taker in competitive UK financial markets.  
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As regards demographic developments, we assume no natural population change but the size 
of the labour force adjusts over time through migration. This adjustment is determined using 
the econometrically parameterised regional net migration function reported in Layard et al 
(1991), augmented to accommodate the amenity effects discussed in Sections 2 and 3. The 
model starts in long-run equilibrium with a zero net migration flow. Subsequently, between 
periods migration updates the labour force. The level of net migration is positively related to 
the gap between regional and national real tax-adjusted wages, and negatively related to the 
gap between regional and national unemployment rates 
(11) 0.08 ln( ) ln( ) 0.06 ln ln(1 ) ln
S R
S R
S R
w w
m u u
cpi cpi
9 E Wª º§ · § ·ª º      « »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¬ ¼ © ¹ © ¹¬ ¼
 
where m is net in-migration as a proportion of the regional population; u is the unemployment 
rate; ȕ is the relative valuation of the public expenditure; the S and R superscripts stand for 
Scotland and the Rest of the World, respectively; and Ȣ is a parameter calibrated to specify 
zero net migration in the base period. In the long run, there is an implied zero-net-migration 
condition that corresponds to the ZNM function given as equation (1). This is 
(12)  ln ln( ) ln 1S SSw = b + 1.33 u  + cpi E W
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
 
where b is again a calibrated parameter. 
 
Wage setting is determined by a regional bargained real wage function that embodies the 
econometrically derived specification given in Layard et al (1991), again augmented by 
amenity effects 
(13)    ln 0.113ln ln 1S SSw  = c  u  + cpi DE W§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹  
ZKHUHĮUHSUHVHQWVWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHDPHQLW\HIIHFWLVUHIOHFWHGLQWKHZDJHEDUJDLQDQGc 
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is a calibrated parameter.13 This formulation explicitly acknowledges imperfect competition 
and unemployment in the labour market.  
   
5. SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
Under the Scotland Act (1998) the Scottish Parliament has the authority to make a balanced-
budget adjustment in public expenditure, over and above the expenditure funded by the 
present block grant. This fiscal adjustment has to be accompanied by a corresponding local 
modification to the basic rate of income tax of up to three pence in the pound. This tax facility 
is known as the Scottish Variable Rate (SVR). 14 In the present paper we use AMOS to 
simulate the long-run effects of activating the full Scottish Variable Rate in order to produce a 
balanced budget increase in public consumption.  Given that the model is parameterised on the 
2004 Social Accounting Matrix for Scotland we use the 2004 HM Treasury Budget estimate 
that these fiscal powers would raise £810 million at 2004 prices, which represents a 1.52 
percentage point rise in average personal income tax in AMOS. 
 
Table 1 reports the long-run proportionate changes in total Scottish employment after the 
introduction of such a tax for combinations of Į and ȕ, where [0,1], [0,2]D E  . That is to 
say, this table reports results for a wide variation in the value that residents (and potential 
migrants) place on additional public expenditure and the incorporation of public expenditure 
decisions into the wage bargain. Figure 2 illustrates these results graphically. 
 
These outcomes are consistent with the analytical results generated in Section 3.2. When the 
parameters Į   ȕ = 1, replicating the standard Keynesian balanced budget multiplier, the 
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employment change is positive at 0.60 percent. Further, the proportionate change in 
employment is positively related to the values of the parameters Į and ȕ, so that positive 
figures are reported for parameter value combinations towards the upper right-hand corner of 
Table 1. However, it is clear that relatively modest reductions in the value of either parameter 
Į or ȕ below unity leads to employment falling with a balanced budget fiscal expansion. For 
example, if ȕ WKHUHLVQRYDOXHRIĮZKLFKZLOOJHQHrate a positive employment change. 
Similarly, if Į < 0.24 even a value of ȕ equal to 2 - so that public expenditure is valued at a 
level twice that of private expenditure - generate a negative employment change. This implies 
that where there is no social bargaining, so that Į = 0, employment falls for any ȕ value within 
the range adopted here.15 
  
In Table 2 we give the proportionate changes in a more comprehensive set of economic 
variables for four particular combinations of Į and ȕ. This allows a fuller investigation of the 
economic forces at work in each of these cases. The first column shows results from the 
simulation where Į   ȕ = 1, which emulates the conventional Keynesian balanced budget 
multiplier case, albeit with endogenous investment and population. This is represented by the 
outcome at the origin in Figure 1. 
 
In this simulation there is no change in either the pre-tax nominal wage or the unemployment 
rate, so that there are no adjustments in a number of key endogenous variables. These include 
long-run value-added prices, the cost-minimising choice of production technique in each 
industry and the level of exports. Essentially the economy operates as an extended input-
output system where, in each sector, output, employment and capital stock vary by the same 
proportionate amount.16 The level and composition of exports remains the same and the 
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demand disturbance comes solely through the switching of private consumption expenditure to 
public expenditure. 
 
As argued in Sections 2 and 3, this expenditure switching has a general expansionary impact 
on the regional economy. The 3.57 percent increase in government expenditure produces an 
increase in Scottish GDP of 0.40 percent and in employment and population of 0.60 percent. 
However, the adjustment in consumption and government demand has an uneven effect across 
sectors. Value added in the sheltered sector, which is most strongly represented in government 
expenditure, increases by 2.11 percent. In the other two sectors, which are more strongly 
related to household consumption, value added falls, but by a relatively small amount, -0.03 
percent, in manufacturing and by -0.31 percent in the non-manufacturing traded sector.17  
 
The second column gives the simulation results with the parameter values Į = 0 and ȕ = 1.  
This simulation is for an expansion in public expenditure that is valued equally to an increase 
in private consumption but where the labour market fails to incorporate this in wage bargains. 
This equilibrium is represented by point D in Figure 1. This combination of parameter values 
generates increases in the nominal pre-tax wage (2.39 percent) and the unemployment rate 
(1.35 percent), resulting in negative competitive effects as value-added prices increase in all 
sectors. The fall in aggregate exports swamps any expansionary impacts generated by the 
other shifts in final demand. Scottish GDP, total employment and population decline by 0.84 
percent, 0.78 percent and 0.68 percent respectively. Activity still increases in the sheltered 
sector. However, this is more than offset by corresponding falls in the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing traded sectors. The decline in Scottish real income is associated with a smaller 
rise in the endogenous public expenditure, which increases by 3.27 percent with these 
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parameter values.  
 
The results in the third column are derived where ȕ = 0. This corresponds to point A in Figure 
1, where the amenity has no value to existing or potential Scottish residents. In this simulation 
there is no change in the post-tax real consumption wage or the unemployment rate. The 
nominal pre-tax wage increases by 2.60 percent, the full extent of the tax plus the rise in the 
consumer price index.  Scottish GDP and employment fall by 0.95 percent and 0.90 percent 
respectively. The impact on individual sectors is qualitatively similar to the case where Į = 0 
and ȕ = 1, but with the activity in all sectors slightly lower than in the earlier simulation. This 
is the worst-case scenario for the impact of the Scottish Variable Rate on economic activity. 
 
The final simulation, reported in column four, adopts the parameter values Į = 0.80, ȕ = 1.20 
and represents an equilibrium lying in the area 0HML in Figure 1 where ȕ > 1 and both 
employment and the nominal pre-tax wage increase. The 0.05 percent rise in the pre-tax 
nominal wage following the introduction of the Scottish Variable Rate reduces exports in all 
sectors.  However, the other expansionary fiscal demand impacts produce a more than 
offsetting effect on overall Scottish aggregate activity.  Therefore, although there are small 
employment falls in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing traded sectors of 0.07 percent 
and 0.37 percent, employment in the sheltered sector rises by 2.14 percent, producing an 
aggregate increase in GDP and employment of 0.37 percent and 0.57 percent respectively.  
 
6. THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS AND SENSITIVITY  
 
Up to this point, the analysis and the simulations have involved changes in long-run 
  23 
equilibrium values. In this section we consider the adjustment path and undertake some 
sensitivity analysis. We look in particular at the sensitivity of the aggregate results to the 
openness of the regional economy. 
 
One criticism of CGE models is that they are not fully econometrically estimated and the 
results might be very sensitive to imposed parameter values. In this sensitivity exercise, we 
follow the method used by Harrison and Vinod (1992) in which the values of key parameters 
are varied randomly around their default levels. Specifically, 1000 simulations are run in 
which the value of the constant elasticity of marginal utility is selected from a uniform 
distribution with the range (0.2 ± 1.6), the value-added production function substitution 
elasticities from the range (0.1 - 0.5) and the trade elasticities from the range (0.1 - 4.0). We 
divide each distribution into 4 equal intervals and adopt a complete randomized factorial 
design. Each of the 1000 simulations is run for 50 periods. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 report the results of systematic sensitivity analysis on the period-by-period 
simulations for two of the (Į, ȕ) combinations reported in Table 2: (1,1) and (0.8, 1.2). In each 
period the graphs show the mean solution value of the percentage increase in total 
employment of the 1000 simulations together with the plus-or-minus-one-standard-deviation 
range of results.  Two broad conclusions can be drawn. 
 
The first is that the economy adjusts very rapidly to the fiscal expansion. In both sets of 
simulations the mean employment change in period 1 is around 60 percent of the long-run 
change and the mean employment reaches its long-run level in period 3. There is some 
overshooting at this point but the adjustment is generally very rapid. Second, the one standard 
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deviation confidence limits are small and fall over time. This is because in these two cases, 
migration and investment reduce the price deviations upon which the production and demand 
elasticities bite. This is particularly apparent in the simulation results reported in Figure 3, 
where Į and ȕ are both unity.  In this simulation in the long run there are no relative price 
changes, so that extended Input-Output results hold. Therefore variation in price elasticities 
plays no role and the confidence range ultimately collapses to a single point (McGregor et al., 
1996). In Figure 4, where (Į, ȕ) values are (0.8, 1.2), price changes are still present in the long 
run so that employment remains sensitive to these parameter values. 
 
As is apparent from equation (4), the overall employment change from a balanced budget 
fiscal expansion depends on the trade-off between the stimulus coming through the 
conventional Keynesian demand shock and the potential negative competitiveness effect 
generated in the labour market. The absolute size of any adverse competitiveness effect will be 
positively related to the openness of the economy. This line of enquiry is particularly relevant 
for regional economies, which are typically much more open than national economies for two 
reasons. First, production for extra-regional exports generally makes up a much greater share 
of the local economy. Second, the price elasticity of demand for regionally traded products 
will be higher than corresponding national trade because regional commodities are closer 
substitutes and transactions costs are lower.18 We can gain a limited indication of the strength 
of these competitiveness effects by showing the sensitivity of our results to changes in the 
export demand elasticities.  
 
Figure 5 gives the percentage changes in Scottish long-run aggregate employment for different 
values of the price elasticity of demand for all (rest of the UK and rest of the world) exports. 
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Two illustrative cases are considered which involve simulations that differ in their D  and E  
values. These simulations, which we label A and B, have the corresponding (D , E ) values: 
(0.8, 0.8) and (0.4, 1.2). 
 
The default value for the export demand elasticity is 2. The results in Table 1, which were 
simulated using the default parameter values, indicate that simulation A registers a positive, 
0.08 percent, and simulation B a negative, -0.10 percent, change in employment. These results 
are replicated in Figure 5. However, note that the total employment change is negatively 
related to the export demand elasticity and this can affect not simply the magnitude, but also 
the sign, of the employment change. In particular, at elasticity values above 2.74, simulation A 
now generates a fall in aggregate employment, whilst at elasticity values below 1.295 
simulation B produces an employment increase. Clearly, the more open the economy, the 
more likely that inverted Haavelmo effects will occur. The corollary is that the more closed the 
economy, the more likely is the conventional Keynesian outcome.19 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper analyzes the net impact of a regional tax increase made in order to finance a rise in 
public consumption that is assumed to have, of itself, no direct supply-side implications. The 
key finding is that the effect on the overall level of activity in the region can be positive or 
negative, depending upon the relative size of positive demand and potentially negative 
competitiveness effects. Further, the sign of this net impact depends crucially on the value that 
existing and potential residents place on the resulting public amenity and the extent to which 
this value is reflected in a moderation of local pay claims. These are important results, given 
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the very large number of regions in the EU and North America that are able to engage in 
balanced budget fiscal expansions. Further, because regions are typically more open than 
nations, the potential negative competitive effects of local tax changes are more important for 
fiscal decisions taken at this level.  
 
Moderation of wage claims is not available if bargaining takes an atomistic form, where there 
is no mechanism to internalise the benefit of the publicly provided amenity. Our simulation 
results suggest that the balanced budget employment multipliers would be negative in such 
circumstances. However, in an imperfectly competitive labour market where unions are 
concerned with the general welfare of their members, such inverted Haavelmo effects do not 
necessarily occur. Under these circumstances an expansion in public expenditure has smaller 
adverse supply-side effects and balanced budget multipliers can become positive. Where 
supply side effects are significantly moderated E\KRXVHKROGV¶YDOXDWLRQRIWKHSXEOLFDPHQLW\
and their bargaining behavior, there can be expansionary impacts on the host economy. In the 
limit, these would generate outcomes of the kind associated with the traditional Keynesian 
vision of regional economies (here in the context of both endogenous investment and inter-
regional migration). In these circumstances a key role for politicians may be to reinforce the 
communal benefits to wage restraint as a trade-off for increased public expenditure. Alex 
Salmond, 6FRWODQG¶VFirst Minister, has made explicit reference to the importance of the social 
wage. The social wage is the wage made up of both public and private consumption. This may 
be a much more important theme in the future.  
 
The case for balanced budget fiscal expansion would, of course, be enhanced by the presence 
of any degree of nominal wage inflexibility at the regional level which would inhibit adverse 
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competitiveness effects. Similarly, the presence of any positive supply-side impact of the 
public expenditure changes introduces a direct countervailing supply-side stimulus to 
competitiveness. For example, the provision of public infrastructure which improves the 
general efficiency of private firms would have such an effect. In this case, the impact on 
competitiveness would depend on the extent to which the increase in productivity directly 
offsets any rise in the nominal wage resulting from the tax increase. Future research should 
explore the importance of these effects, and of the potential for the various elements of 
government expenditure to be valued differently. Finally, the introduction of balanced budget 
fiscal adjustments in an inter-regional context which incorporates endogenous policy 
responses would be a valuable avenue of research.  
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TABLE 1: Long-run % change in employment following the introduction of the Scottish 
Variable Rate, for combinations of parameters Į and ȕ* 
 
 
    Į 
  
  
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 
ɴ 
2.00 -0.66 -0.11 0.44 1.00 1.55 2.12 
1.80 -0.69 -0.19 0.30 0.80 1.31 1.81 
1.60 -0.71 -0.27 0.17 0.61 1.06 1.51 
1.40 -0.73 -0.35 0.04 0.42 0.81 1.20 
1.20 -0.76 -0.43 -0.10 0.23 0.57 0.90 
1.00 -0.78 -0.51 -0.23 0.04 0.32 0.60 
0.80 -0.80 -0.58 -0.36 -0.14 0.08 0.30 
0.60 -0.83 -0.66 -0.50 -0.33 -0.17 0.00 
0.40 -0.85 -0.74 -0.63 -0.52 -0.41 -0.30 
0.20 -0.87 -0.82 -0.76 -0.71 -0.65 -0.60 
0.00 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 
 
*The parameter Į measures the extent to which the local amenity created by the public 
expenditure is reflected in wage bargaining (equation 5) and the parameter ȕ measures the 
marginal valuation of the amenity as against private consumption (equations 1 and 5).    
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 TABLE 2: Long-run % change in key economic variables following the introduction of the 
Scottish Variable Rate, for combinations of parameters Į and ȕ * 
  
Regional Bargaining 
  
Į ȕ=1 
 
Į=0 ȕ=1 
 ȕ=0  
Į=0.8 
ȕ=1.2 
GDP  0.40  -0.84  -0.95  0.37 
Consumption -1.30  -1.36  -1.36  -1.30 
Govt expend. 3.57  3.27  3.25  3.56 
Investment 0.05  -1.03  -1.12  0.03 
Nominal pre-tax wage 0.00  2.39  2.60  0.05 
Real post-tax wage -1.93  -0.15  0.00  -1.89 
         
Total employment 0.60  -0.78  -0.90  0.57 
Manufacturing -0.03  -1.53  -1.66  -0.07 
Non-Manufacturing Traded -0.33  -2.02  -2.17  -0.37 
Sheltered 2.16  1.27  1.19  2.14 
Unemployment Rate 0.00  1.35  0.00  0.32 
Total population 0.60  -0.68  -0.90  0.59 
         
Price of value added        
Manufacturing 0.00  1.76  1.92  0.04 
Non-Manufacturing Traded 0.00  1.56  1.69  0.04 
Sheltered 0.00  1.94  2.11  0.04 
         
Shadow price of capital        
Manufacturing 0.00  0.48  0.52  0.01 
Non-Manufacturing Traded 0.00  0.48  0.52  0.01 
Sheltered 0.00  0.48  0.52  0.01 
         
Consumer Price Index 0.00  0.57  0.62  0.01 
         
Value added        
Manufacturing -0.03  -1.35  -1.46  -0.06 
Non-Manufacturing Traded -0.31  -1.76  -1.88  -0.34 
Sheltered 2.11  1.31  1.25  2.09 
         
Capital stock        
Manufacturing -0.03  -0.97  -1.05  -0.06 
Non-Manufacturing Traded -0.29  -1.45  -1.55  -0.32 
Sheltered 1.87  1.50  1.47  1.87 
         
Exports        
Manufacturing 0.00  -0.64  -0.69  -0.01 
Non-Manufacturing Traded 0.00  -0.89  -0.96  -0.02 
Sheltered 0.00  -1.42  -1.54  -0.03 
 
*The parameter Į measures the extent to which the local amenity created by the public 
expenditure is reflected in wage bargaining (equation 5) and the parameter ȕ measures the 
marginal valuation of the amenity as against private consumption (equations 1 and 5).    
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FIGURE 1: The real wage bargaining and zero net migration functions represented in nominal 
pre-tax wage (dW) and employment rate (de) space. 
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FIGURE 2: Long-run % change in employment following the introduction of the Scottish 
Variable Rate, for combinations of parameters Į and ȕ*.  
 
 
*The parameter Į measures the extent to which the local amenity created by the public 
expenditure is reflected in wage bargaining (equation 5) and the parameter ȕ measures the 
marginal valuation of the amenity as against private consumption (equations 1 and 5).    
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FIGURE 3: The sensitivity of the percentage change in total employment to parameter 
variability (for D =  E =1)*. 
 
 
*The parameter Į measures the extent to which the local amenity created by the public 
expenditure is reflected in wage bargaining (equation 5) and the parameter ȕ measures the 
marginal valuation of the amenity as against private consumption (equations 1 and 5).    
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FIGURE 4: The sensitivity of the percentage change in total employment to parameter 
variability (for D =0.8 and E=1)*. 
 
*The parameter Į measures the extent to which the local amenity created by the public 
expenditure is reflected in wage bargaining (equation 5) and the parameter ȕ measures the 
marginal valuation of the amenity as against private consumption (equations 1 and 5).    
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FIGURE 5: Sensitivity of employment change to variations in the price elasticity of demand 
for exports for two simulations with diffĮĮerent values for the parameters Į and ȕ *.  
 
 
 
*Simulation A has both the Į and ȕ values set to 0.8. Simulation B has Į and ȕ values set to 0.4 
and 1.2 respectively. The parameter Į measures the extent to which the local amenity created 
by the public expenditure is reflected in wage bargaining (equation 5) and the parameter ȕ 
measures the marginal valuation of the amenity as against private consumption (equations 1 
and 5).    
 . 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1
  Layard et al. (1991, Ch. 6) also assume competitive commodity markets in their analysis of 
disaggregated labour markets.  
 
2
 For studies that consider the impact of local taxation used to finance productive investment, 
such as public infrastructure and human capital improvement, see Deepak et al. (2001) and 
Seung and Kraybill (2001). 
 
3
 This flow equilibrium formulation is extensively used in the migration literature. See Lecca 
et al. (2010) for further references. 
  
4
 Equations (1) to (5) are expressed as total differentials given the following normalisation: w, 
W, N, cpi =1, Ĳ = 0 and n = e. The corresponding equations in level form are given in Lecca et 
al. (2010). 
 
5
 In the present paper the migration decision is positively related to the amenity, as in Tiebout 
(1956). However, a positive ȕ simply requires that the amenity is valued to some degree by 
households and is not dependent on the strict assumptions of the Tiebout model. 
 
6
 That is to say, the representative worker is indifferent between $1 marginal private 
consumption and the public good implications of a local fiscal arrangement where he or she 
pays $1 more in tax. 
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7
 Silvestre (1990) describes this general equilibrium labour demand curve as the "full" demand 
curve for labour. No nominal inertia is implied by this formulation, which is a re-
parameterised version of a specification in which labour demand is a declining function of the 
real product wage. In principle, this labour demand curve could be upward sloping as a result 
of income effects produced through changes in the terms of trade. However, in a very open 
regional economy we always expect the negative competitiveness impacts to dominate and 
this is reflected in the simulation results reported in Sections 5 and 6.  
 
8
 We discount the possibility that the labor supply decision could be directly influenced by the 
DPHQLW\WKURXJKWKHDPHQLW\¶VEHLQJFRPSOHPHQWDU\WRleisure, for example. 
 
9
 The origin is a stable equilibrium with the initial ZNM0 and BRW0 functions. For example, 
an increase in the employment rate will lead to an initial increase in the real wage through the 
bargaining function. However, this generates net in migration, a corresponding rise in the 
labor force and a subsequent reduction in the employment rate leading to a fall in the real 
wage. In migration will continue until the initial equilibrium wage and employment rate levels 
are reinstated. 
 
10
 Lecca et al. (2010) augments this analysis by discussing models which impose national 
wage bargaining or hold regional population fixed. It also reports the corresponding simulation 
results generated using a Computable General Equilibrium framework. 
  
11
 For a full specification of an early version of the model, see Harrigan et al. (1991). For the 
present multi-period, forward-looking version see Lecca et al. (2013).  
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12
 The key characteristic of the sheltered sector is that it has very low, but not zero, exposure 
to trade. For a more detailed breakdown of these aggregate sectors see Lecca et al. (2010). 
 
13
 Equations (11), (12) and (13) are expressed, and estimated, in terms of the local 
unemployment rate but this is simply equal to one minus the employment rate used in Sections 
2 and 3. A wage curve elasticity of around -0.1 has been found over a large number of 
empirical studies across different countries and time periods (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2005). 
    
14
 The main source of funding for the Scottish Government is a population-based block grant 
from the UK Government. The SVR has never been used to augment this funding. However, 
under the Scotland Act (2012) the Scottish Government will have to set a portion of the 
income tax rate for Scotland, even if this only matches the rate in the rest of the UK. But the 
possible variation has been increased to up to ten pence in the pound on all income tax bands. 
The Scottish Government has very limited alternative sources of additional revenue and has 
presently virtually no borrowing powers.  
 
15
 In Table 1 a zero employment change identifies the value of E , defined in equation (10), for 
a given value of D . The relationship between E  and D  is downward sloping and convex. 
This result requires a positive value for the second term on the RHS of equation (10), which 
occurs with a value of (1 )Wn cpiW  less than the absolute value for Wn . 
   
16
 The figures reported in Table 2 do not show this precisely because the results given for the 
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three sectors are for aggregations of the 11 sectors in the model. For more sectoral detail see 
Lecca et al. (2010). 
  
17
 The per capita changes for all variables can be calculated by comparing the percentage 
change in the variable as against the percentage change in population. For example, GDP per 
head falls in all the simulations reported in Table 2. This primarily reflects the long-run 
changes in sectoral composition of GDP brought about by the introduction of the tax. 
  
18
 Regions are also generally more open than nations because of the greater ease of labor 
migration. In our model the presence of migration typically amplifies the absolute size of the 
employment change but only exceptionally alters the sign of that change. For a more detailed 
discussion see Lecca et al. (2010). 
  
19
 We also have performed sensitivity analysis on individual Armington elasticities. Economic 
activity is much more sensitive to varying the ROW, as against the RUK, values. Sensitivity 
was also performed for variations in elasticity in the bargaining function, but these had a very 
small impact on the change in economic activity.    
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